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1469 
Who Now Sits atop the Pyramid of 
Violence? 
Harrison Weimer* 
This Note seeks to provoke a conversation about the rise in power of federal prosecutors 
at the expense of district court judges, focusing on the controlled-substances context. While 
referencing Robert Cover’s portrayal of the justice system as a “pyramid of violence,” this Note 
shows how the federal mandatory-minimum sentencing laws and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines brought about this change. These sentencing schemes 
have anchored what prosecutors and judges deem an appropriate sentence. Prosecutors are 
thinking about sentences while deciding what charges to bring. After a discussion about 
sentencing legislation and current sentencing procedures, this Note identifies a need for reform 
in the federal criminal justice system. The elimination of mandatory sentencing laws, the 
normalization of departure from the Guidelines, and the creation of the executive prosecutor 
role are reforms identified in this Note. 
  
 
* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor Gregory 
Shaffer for his guidance and his Jurisprudence course that prompted this Note. Many thanks to 
professors, family, and friends for suggested revisions and to the UC Irvine Law Review editors for their 
stellar work throughout the editorial process. 
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We begin, then, not with what the judges say, but with what they do. The 
judges deal pain and death. That is not all that they do. Perhaps that is not what 
they usually do. But they do deal death, and pain. From John Winthrop through 
Warren Burger they have sat atop a pyramid of violence . . . .1 
- Robert Cover 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)2  and the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19863 forever changed the landscape of the punishments 
delivered by federal courts to criminal defendants.4 Prior to 1987,5 district court 
judges enjoyed wide discretion in choosing how to sentence criminals and, per legal 
scholar Professor Robert Cover, “they have sat atop a pyramid of violence.”6 With 
the implementation of the Guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(Commission) and mandatory minimums passed by Congress for  
controlled-substance offenses, the Commission and federal prosecutors have now 
 
1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986) (emphasis omitted). 
2. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sent’g tbl. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)). 
4. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks of the Honorable Edwin Meese III 
Attorney General of the United States on the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Before the 
American Law Institute 11 (May 22, 1987), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/
2011/08/23/05-22-1987.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3Z2-A4U3] (“These guidelines mark a decisive 
turning point in the history of the federal criminal justice system. They point us towards the sound, 
predictable, tough yet rational sentencing structure that the federal system long has needed.”). 
5. Magdeline Jensen, This Issue in Brief, 55 FED. PROB. 1, 1 (1991) (“Y[ears from] now,  
1987—the year sentencing guidelines went into effect—will be remembered as a milestone in Federal 
criminal justice.”). 
6. Cover, supra note 1. 
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challenged district court judges for the top spot on this pyramid.7 More so than 
judges, these major players in the federal criminal justice system limit judicial 
discretion in sentencing and now play a bigger role in determining the price 
defendants pay. Professor Cover, although writing before the mandatory-minimum 
era, failed to acknowledge the limiting role of district court judges because of the 
minimal number of trials held in federal court.8 
This Note seeks to show how the Commission and federal prosecutors dictate 
the punishment outcomes for defendants in controlled-substances cases more so 
than district court judges. While the Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s mandatory minimums 
are binding, and while the Guidelines anchor judges’ decisions during sentencing,9 
federal prosecutors use these quantitative limits on judicial discretion as a tool to 
push plea bargains to advance their position to the top of the pyramid of violence. 
To restore fairness and individualism to the criminal justice system, mandatory 
sentencing provisions must be put to rest, departure from the Guidelines should be 
normalized, and executive prosecutors should be explored as a possibility in 
prosecutorial offices. 
I. CONSTRUCTING THE PYRAMID 
A. Violence and the Word 
Professor Cover, a liberalist, was a legal scholar and professor at Yale Law 
School until 1986.10 Professor Cover wrote, as the introductory sentence of his most 
famous article Violence and the Word, “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of 
pain and death.” 11  Professor Cover meant that when a judge formulates an 
interpretation of the text of the law, somebody else loses liberties such as freedom, 
 
7. A federal criminal defendant is sentenced under both sentencing schemes if there are 
mandatory-minimum laws that apply to the case. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16–17 ( 2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/ 
20170711_Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4SS-JSP7 ] [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN 
OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES ]. 
8. John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do Are 
Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. ( June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/ 
06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty [https:// 
perma.cc/W76U-Y4MX]. 
9. Although Congress enacted a “mandatory” guidelines system in the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, in 2005 the Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentencing system was unconstitutional. 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). The guidelines were then deemed “advisory.”  
Id. at 246–47. However, the advisory Guidelines continue to anchor federal sentencing determinations. 
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 549–50 (2013). 
10.  Guido Calabresi, Michael J. Graetz, Barbara A. Black, Stephen Wizner, David Brion Davis, 
Tanina Rostain, Owen M. Fiss & James Ponet, Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1699,  
1699 (1987). 
11.  Cover, supra note 1, at 1601. 
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children, or property.12  This legal interpretation is constrained by the need to 
anesthetize the judge against feeling responsible for the violence and by the need to 
convince other officials to carry out the sentence.13 Therefore, the judge “s[its] atop 
[this] pyramid of violence.”14 
Although sentencing is routine to a judge’s duties, judges are removed from 
the practical implications of their sentences and are not forced to carry out the very 
“violence” they authorize. Professor Cover notes that “[t]he violence of the act of 
sentencing is most obvious when observed from the defendant’s perspective.”15 
While Professor Cover’s work is a seminal piece that first emphasized the role of 
violence in legal interpretation, Professor Cover’s work now incorrectly identifies 
the judge as the leading role in this setting because the role of the prosecutor has 
risen to the top. To be fair to Professor Cover, the U.S. criminal justice system has 
shifted since Violence and the Word. Mandatory minimums and the Guidelines of 
today were not part of the legal landscape considered by Professor Cover. 
B. Implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
The passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ultimately resulted in the 
creation of the Guidelines.16 The Act’s objective was to improve the ability of the 
criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective yet fair sentencing 
procedure.17 With honesty, clarity, and proportionality in mind, Congress sought 
practical uniformity in sentencing by lessening the wide inequalities in sentences 
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. 18  The 
Guidelines were a response to critics who thought “[b]oth by substantive controls 
and through procedural revisions the unchecked powers of the untutored judge 
should be subject to a measure of regulation. The vague, indefinite, and uncritical 
use of indeterminate sentences calls for restriction through meaningful definitions 
and discriminating judgments.”19 The Guidelines manual, first released in 1987, has 
generally been updated annually.20 The most recent manual is the 2018 version.21 
  
 
12.  Id. This loss of liberty can be in the form of incarceration, monetary damages, custodial 
rights and privileges, or other means. When a judge decides how to interpret or apply the written text 
of a law, the decision often has negative real-world effects on at least one of the parties. 
13. Id. at 1626–27. 
14.  Id. at 1609. 
15.  Id. at 1608. 
16.  18 U.S.C. § 3551. 
17.  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 69 (1983) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 3551 “should permit enough 
flexibility to individualize sentences according to the characteristics of the offense and the offender, 
while at the same time resulting in the imposition of sentences that treat offenders consistently  
and fairly”). 
18.  Id. 
19.  Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1972). 
20.  See Guidelines Archive, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/archive  
[https://perma.cc/FES6-HFTQ] (last visited July 20, 2021). 
21.  Id. 
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Figure 1: Sentencing Table.22 
In controlled-substances cases, the offense level, which directs the sentence 
for each defendant, is primarily driven by the quantity of the controlled substance.23 
Offense levels, seen in figure 1, range from one to forty-three, and enhancements 
for playing a leadership role, possessing a firearm, or obstructing justice can drive 
up this number but play a very minor role compared to the quantity of the 
 
22. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sent’g tbl. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
23. Id. § 2D1.1(c). 
 
SENTENCING TABLE 
(in months of imprisonment) 





(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
 III 
(4, 5, 6) 
 IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
 V 
(10, 11, 12) 
 VI 
(13 or more) 
            
Zone A 
1 0–6 0–6  0–6  0–6  0–6  0–6 
2 0–6 0–6  0–6  0–6  0–6  1–7 
3 0–6 0–6  0–6  0–6  2–8  3–9 
4 0–6 0–6  0–6  2–8  4–10  6–12 
5 0–6 0–6  1–7  4–10  6–12  9–15 
6 0–6 1–7  2–8  6–12  9–15  12–18 
7 0–6 2–8  4–10  8–14  12–18  15–21 
8 0–6 4–10  6–12  10–16  15–21  18–24 
Zone B 
9 4–10 6–12  8–14  12–18  18–24  21–27 
10 6–12 8–14  10–16  15–21  21–27  24–30 




12 10–16 12–18  15–21  21–27  27–33  30–37 
13 12–18 15–21  18–24  24–30  30–37  33–41 
Zone D 
14 15–21 18–24  21–27  27–33  33–41  37–46 
15 18–24 21–27  24–30  30–37  37–46  41–51 
16 21–27 24–30  27–33  33–41  41–51  46–57 
17 24–30 27–33  30–37  37–46  46–57  51–63 
18 27–33 30–37  33–41  41–51  51–63  57–71 
19 30–37 33–41  37–46  46–57  57–71  63–78 
20 33–41 37–46  41–51  51–63  63–78  70–87 
21 37–46 41–51  46–57  57–71  70–87  77–96 
22 41–51 46–57  51–63  63–78  77–96  84–105 
23 46–57 51–63  57–71  70–87  84–105  92–115 
24 51–63 57–71  63–78  77–96  92–115  100–125 
25 57–71 63–78  70–87  84–105  100–125  110–137 
26 63–78 70–87  78–97  92–115  110–137  120–150 
27 70–87 78–97  87–108  100–125  120–150  130–162 
28 78–97 87–108  97–121  110–137  130–162  140–175 
29 87–108 97–121  108–135  121–151  140–175  151–188 
30 97–121 108–135  121–151  135–168  151–188  168–210 
31 108–135 121–151  135–168  151–188  168–210  188–235 
32 121–151 135–168  151–188  168–210  188–235  210–262 
33 135–168 151–188  168–210  188–235  210–262  235–293 
34 151–188 168–210  188–235  210–262  235–293  262–327 
35 168–210 188–235  210–262  235–293  262–327  292–365 
36 188–235 210–262  235–293  262–327  292–365  324–405 
37 210–262 235–293  262–327  292–365  324–405  360–life 
38 235–293 262–327  292–365  324–405  360–life  360–life 
39 262–327 292–365  324–405  360–life  360–life  360–life 
40 292–365 324–405  360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life 
41 324–405 360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life 
42 360–life 360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life 
43 life life  life  life  life  life 
 
November 1, 2016 
Clean Final Edit_Weimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/19/21  3:09 PM 
1474 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1469 
substance.24 For example, possession of 450 kilograms or more of cocaine yields a 
base offense level of thirty-eight25 while 2 kilograms to 3.5 kilograms of cocaine 
yields a base offense level of twenty-six,26 but firearms or obstruction-of-justice 
enhancements only warrant an additional two points.27 The enhancements, found 
in Chapter Three of the Guidelines, are applied after the base offense level is 
identified.28 Adjustments can shift the offense level up or down depending on their 
nature.29 To put the above offense levels in the context of the length of sentence to 
be imposed, a convicted defendant with an offense level of thirty-eight warrants a 
sentence of 235 to 293 months while an offense level of twenty-six warrants a 
sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.30 An enhancement for abuse of 
position of trust or use of special skill, for example, adds two points to the base 
offense level.31 In the scenario above, the offense levels would be adjusted to forty 
and twenty-eight, yielding sentences of 292 to 365 months and seventy-eight to 
ninety-seven months, assuming the defendant has no criminal history.32 
The Guidelines indicate the Commission’s preference for punishing primarily 
based on the quantity rather than on the role in the operation. Enhancements serve 
as adjustments rather than as a weighted starting point. Initially, the Guidelines 
often provided harsher sentences than those indicated by the mandatory minimums 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.33 Since the implementation of the Guidelines 
and the decreased intensity of the U.S. War on Drugs, the corresponding offense 
level for each quantity of drug has become more forgiving for defendants. For 
example, the “Crack Minus Two Amendment” of 2007 reduced by two points the 
base offense levels assigned by the Drug Quantity Table for each quantity of crack 
cocaine.34 The Commission expanded this reduction through the “Drugs Minus 
 
24.  See id. ch. 3. Criminal history plays a larger role than leadership or firearm enhancements 
but less of a role than the quantity of a controlled substance. See id. ch. 4 (identifying how criminal 
history and criminal livelihood are calculated and affect the sentencing); supra Figure 1. 
25.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
26.  Id. § 2D1.1(c)(7). 
27.  Id. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 3C1.1. 
28.  See id. ch. 3. 
29.  See id. 
30.  Both advisory sentence ranges assume no criminal history. See supra Figure 1. “A defendant 
with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of 
greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to 
society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.” 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
31. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
32.  See supra Figure 1. 
33.  See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, CJPF.ORG, https://www.cjpf.org/
mandatory-minimums [https://perma.cc/4ENC-NDF7] (last visited July 20, 2021) (“For over two 
decades beginning in 1987, the sentencing guidelines had a near-mandatory quality, and provided for 
sentences for drug quantities greater than the minimum trigger quantities in the drug statute (21  
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)), and provided for sentences longer than the mandatory minimum sentence for  
that drug.”). 
34. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amends. 706, 711 & 713 (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2018). 
Clean Final Edit_Weimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/19/21  3:09 PM 
2021] THE PYRAMID OF VIOLENCE 1475 
Two Amendment,” which then reduced by two points the base offense levels 
assigned by the Drug Quantity Table for all drugs in 2014.35 
C. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 substantially revised the federal drug laws, 
introducing mandatory-minimum sentences. 36  Mandatory-minimum sentencing 
laws force a district court judge to hand down a prison sentence based on the 
charges a prosecutor brings against a defendant. The prosecutor, in part, bases the 
charges he or she brings on the quantity and type of drugs. Judges can still sentence 
more than the mandatory minimum but cannot go below. These laws strip a judge’s 
traditional authority to account for the nuances and actual circumstances—whether 
mitigating or aggravating—of the crimes alleged and the characteristics of the 
individual defendant when imposing the sentence. For example, the 1986 Act 
required a minimum sentence of five years for drug offenses that involved 5 grams 
of crack, 500 grams of cocaine, 1 kilogram of heroin, 40 grams of a substance with 
a detectable amount of fentanyl, 5 grams of methamphetamine, 100 kilograms or 
100 plants of marijuana, among other drugs.37 These wide-ranging quantities for 
different drugs indicate the differing internal priorities of the War on Drugs. To put 
it into context, “[f]or methamphetamine, offenders face a minimum five-year 
sentence for distribution of five grams, the weight of five Sweet-n-Low packets, 
when a heavy user might go through a gram in a day.”38 As the quantity of drugs 
increase, the mandatory-minimum sentence increases accordingly. On the most 
severe end of the spectrum, “[i]f any person commits [another] violation after a 
prior conviction for a serious drug felony . . . and if death or serious bodily injury 
results from the use of such substance[, the defendant] shall be sentenced to life 
imprisonment.”39 Mandatory minimums apply in a little less than half of the federal 
controlled-substance cases in the United States.40 
Unlike the corresponding system of the Guidelines, which now provides an 
advisory sentence range after the computation of circumstances by the judge, 
 
35.  See KIM STEVEN HUNT, DAVID RUTTER & TODD KOSTYSHAK, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
RETROACTIVITY & RECIDIVISM: THE DRUGS MINUS TWO AMENDMENT 1 (2020). 
36.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)). 
37.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33. 
38.  Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33. 
39.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Mandatory minimums were also put in place for recidivism. See, 
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (requiring life sentence if a defendant has two or more prior drug felonies). This 
was changed with the implementation of the First Step Act in 2018. See First Step Act of 2018,  
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2)(A)(ii), 132 Stat. 5220, 5220 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841). 
40. In the fiscal year 2016, mandatory minimums were used less often in federal drug offenses 
(44.7% in fiscal year 2016 versus 66.1% in fiscal year 2010) but continued to result in long sentences 
for drug offenders. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG OFFENSES 
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4–5 (2017) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES ]. 
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mandatory-minimum laws allow no room for judicial discretion.41  The average 
sentence for drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
is ninety-four months of imprisonment, more than double the average sentence for 
offenders whose drug offense does not carry a mandatory minimum.42 In practice, 
“Congress abandoned the idea that [f]ederal judges—appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the U.S. Senate—have the wisdom and training to identify the 
most serious drug offenders and punish them appropriately.”43 
Although Congress passed the mandatory-minimum laws with an aim towards 
prosecuting major drug traffickers, this has not been the case. Almost three-quarters 
of federal inmates serving time for drug offenses were sentenced under mandatory 
minimums. 44  In 2009, the Commission reported that “high-level” suppliers or 
importers comprised only 10.9% of federal defendants.45 Through the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Congress wanted to impose heavy penalties for certain kinds of 
serious cases, including those involving drugs, to deter crime and create consistency 
in penalties across federal districts.46 However, judges have been unable to exercise 
their discretion to combat the negative effect these mandatory minimums have had 
on low-level, nonviolent offenders. Many of these low-level offenders have received 
draconian sentences that pale in comparison to those of violent offenders.47 For 
example, a “mule”—a low-level person who carries a large quantity of illicit drugs, 
often inside of his or her body—can be punished either strictly based on the amount 
in his or her body or based on the whole operation.48 However, the Guidelines 
attempt to “reward” those who play minimal roles in the crime by adjusting their 
 
41.  See id.; see also Lori Atherton, Federal Judge, Former U.S. Attorney Discuss Mandatory 





42.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 36. 
43.  See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33. 
44.  Mandatory-minimum penalties continue to have a significant impact on the size and 
composition of the federal prison population. Approximately half (49.1%) of all federal inmates are 
drug offenders and 72.3% of those offenders are serving a mandatory minimum. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 4. 
45.  Id. at 45. Wholesalers of any amount made up 21.2%; street-level dealers made up 17.2%, 
and couriers made up 23.1% of those sentenced for drug offenses. Id. Only 2.2% were managers or 
supervisors. Id. The rest of federal drug defendants were other low-level offenders, even marginally 
involved friends and family of the accused. Id. 
46.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 201 (2019) (“The members 
of Congress who voted for these changes believed they would minimize unwarranted disparities in 
sentencing, make criminal sentences more transparent, and improve public safety.”). 
47. Atherton, supra note 41. 
48.  “When the traffickers got to know that I held an American passport, they realized that they 
could use me to mule illicit drugs into the United States of America. I was instructed to swallow drugs 
and board a plane.” Drug Mules: Swallowed by the Illicit Drug Trade, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS 
& CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/southasia/frontpage/2012/october/drug-mules_-swallowed-by-
the-illicit-drug-trade.html [https://perma.cc/M4LG-C9VE] (last visited July, 20, 2021). 
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offense level.49 These discrepancies that exist between the intent behind mandatory 
minimums and their effect are not an issue of the past; drug offenses remain the 
most commonly charged offenses carrying mandatory-minimum penalties.50 
D. Why Judges Are Not on Top 
Prior to 1986, the federal sentencing system was almost entirely unregulated. 
Judges sentenced with minimal legal constraints, and review by appellate courts 
almost never overturned district court sentences.51 However, judges are no longer 
at the top of the pyramid of violence because they are now restricted by the 
Guidelines and mandatory minimums. With the implementation of the Guidelines 
and mandatory minimums, both the Commission and federal prosecutors now play 
bigger roles than they did before 1987. Although no longer mandatory, the 
Guidelines continue to be the starting point—and most of the time the  
endpoint—for district judges when determining sentences. 52  The Guidelines 
anchor judges’ and prosecutors’ thinking during punishment. Since the Supreme 
Court ruled to make the Guidelines advisory to preserve a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial by jury in United States v. Booker in 2005, there have been 
eight Supreme Court cases that directly discussed the Guidelines.53 Collectively, 
these eight decisions have “not only significantly affected the sentencing practices 
of the district courts but also have reinstated a deferential standard of review in the 
appellate courts. Nonetheless, the Commission and the guidelines continue to play 
an important role in federal sentencing.”54 
However, the mandatory minimums completely remove room for any judicial 
discretion and often force judges to sentence in a manner they may view as unjust. 
Eastern District of Michigan Judge Avern Cohn said, 
“The most sacred quality that judges guard most is discretion, which is 
choice . . . . Mandatory minimums take that choice away from a judge. 
You’re obligated to follow the statute, and if you don’t follow the statue 
[sic], your decision is going to go to the court of appeals and get reversed. 
And judges don’t like to have their decisions reversed.”55 
 
49.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
50.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 16. 
51.  See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“We begin with the general 
proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute 
under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.”). 
52.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246–47 (2005). 
53.  See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 
40 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90–93 (2007); Irizarry v. United States, 553  
U.S. 708, 709–10 (2008); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (per curiam); Nelson  
v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351–52 (2009) (per curiam); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 
(2010); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480–81 (2011). 
54.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES  
V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 10 (2012). 
55.  Atherton, supra note 41. 
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Judges’ discretion is now limited by the Guidelines and mandatory minimums, 
yet prosecutors are able to use the Guidelines and mandatory minimums when 
charging. Further, prosecutors routinely use the Guidelines as a tool for pushing 
plea bargains.56 
Professor Cover’s statements now overemphasize the role of the judge when 
it comes to convicting and sentencing. Although judges legitimize the “violence” 
that stems from the federal criminal justice system, the legal interpretation 
articulated by judges, as discussed by Professor Cover, is also limited by the fact that 
only two percent of those charged with drug offenses in federal court go to trial.57 
Additionally, most of these trials are tried by juries, not the bench.58 
While the Guidelines were published after Professor Cover’s Violence and the 
Word, he would likely agree that the Guidelines and mandatory minimums further 
remove the judge morally and ethically from the “violence” they authorize by 
further limiting their legal interpretation and discretion. 59  After leaving the 
courtroom, a defendant’s sentence is traditionally carried out by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons or the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services office. Since the publication 
of Violence and the Word, federal prosecutors, aided by the Commission and the 
Guidelines, have entered the legal landscape with more power to wield violence. 
II. RISE TO THE TOP 
A. The U.S. Sentencing Commission 
The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch created by 
Congress as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.60 The President nominates 
the seven voting members of the Commission.61 These members must then be 
confirmed by the Senate.62 There must be at least three federal judges on the 
Commission.63 Furthermore, there cannot be more than four members from the 
same political party on the Commission.64  The Attorney General, or Attorney 
General’s designee, and the chair of the U.S. Parole Commission serve as nonvoting 
 
56.  Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES  
(Sept. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-
push-for-plea-bargains.html [https://perma.cc/4P4L-W627] (“After decades of new laws to toughen 
sentencing for criminals, prosecutors have gained greater leverage to extract guilty pleas from 
defendants and reduce the number of cases that go to trial, often by using the threat of more serious 
charges with mandatory sentences or other harsher penalties.”). 
57.  Only 499 of the 21,771 drug cases filed in federal district courts went to trial in 2018. 
Gramlich, supra note 8. 
58.  Id. 
59.  See Cover, supra note 1, at 1626–27. 
60 . Organization, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/ 
organization [https://perma.cc/4Q45-QVWS] (last visited July 20, 2021); 18 U.S.C. § 3551. 
61.  Organization, supra note 60. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
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members of the Commission.65 The agency’s mission is to establish sentencing 
policies and practices for the federal courts, including guidelines regarding the 
appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders convicted in federal 
district court. 66  Further, the Commission advises Congress on crime policy  
and research.67 
The Commission sits higher on the pyramid of violence than district court 
judges. The Commission is the sole determiner of what offense level is warranted 
by each quantity of each controlled substance.68 From there, the Commission then 
dictates what advisory guideline sentence range is warranted by each offense level. 
Therefore, the Commission can control the sentence of controlled-substance 
offenders based primarily on the quantity of narcotics a defendant is responsible 
for. The Commission formally limits judicial discretion by indicating where the 
judge must start sentencing computation.69 
Judges have generally disliked the Guidelines since its first release in 1987 
because the Guidelines effectually eliminated their discretion and were commonly 
perceived as draconian.70 In 2010, the Commission conducted a survey of federal 
judges to garner opinions of the makeup and practical impact of the Guidelines.71 
Question Eight of the survey asked judges, in their opinion, about the 
appropriateness of the Guidelines and whether they thought the sentencing ranges 
were too high or too low.72 Of the drug offenses listed in the survey,73 about 57% 
thought the sentencing ranges were appropriate, about 4.5% thought the ranges 
were too low, and about 38% thought the ranges were too high.74 Although there 
is some consensus on the appropriateness of the Guidelines, over forty percent of 
the judges surveyed would prefer to sentence outside of the sentencing ranges for 
controlled-substance offenses.75 
For better or for worse, judges are initially bound by calculating the advisory 
sentence under the Guidelines. However, a judge’s decision is final even if it is 
 
65.  Id. 
66.  About, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page [https://perma.cc/ 
AE8W-KSE6] (last visited July 20, 2021). 
67.  Id. 
68.  See Drug Cases, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/drug-cases 
[https://perma.cc/8Z6L-GTXM] (last visited July 20, 2021). 
69.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”). 
70.  Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39  
VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 724 (2005). 
71.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, at 1–4 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS 
OF SURVEY]. 
72.  Id. at pt. III, tbl.8. 
73.  Heroin, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, ecstasy, and 
oxycodone. Id. 
74.  See id. 
75.  Id. 
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outside the Guidelines’ range as long as it is reasonable. 76  At the same time, 
sentences that are within the Guidelines’ range are presumed to be reasonable.77 
Unlike judges before 1987, judges now must give a justification for departures from 
the advisory sentence range.78 The Supreme Court has further advocated that the 
greater the variance from the advisory guideline range, the more significant the 
justification must be.79 
In addition to updating and releasing the annual Guidelines, the Commission 
also produces reports about the practical implications of the Guidelines. Through 
these reports, the Commission gathers sentencing data and makes formal 
recommendations to Congress. These recommendations have suggested 
a strong and effective [federal] sentencing guidelines system best serves the 
purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. . . . [If] Congress decides to 
exercise its power to direct [federal] sentencing policy by enacting 
mandatory minimum penalties, . . . such penalties should (1) not be 
excessively severe, (2) be narrowly tailored to apply only to those offenders 
who warrant such punishment, and (3) be applied consistently. . . . 
Congress [should] request prison impact analyses [from the Commission] 
as early as possible in its legislative process whenever it considers enacting 
or amending [mandatory minimum] penalties . . . .80 
In 2011, the Commission explained that it “stands ready to work with 
Congress on measures that can be taken to enhance the strength and effectiveness 
of the current guidelines system and address the problems with certain mandatory-
minimum penalties.”81  With the ability to formally interact with Congress, the 
Commission is in a unique position compared to federal judges. Although the 
Commission is an extension of the judiciary, the same separation of powers that 
traditionally divides the two branches seems to be milder. 
B. Federal Prosecutors 
In district courts, one of the roles of the U.S. Attorneys is to prosecute criminal 
cases brought by the federal government.82 U.S. Attorneys have all the resources of 
the government and traditionally have federal agents to assist them in the 
 
76.  See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007). 
77.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). “A substantively reasonable sentence is 
one that is ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to accomplish [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)’s sentencing 
goals.” United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 977 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
78.  See United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When a sentencing ‘judge 
decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the deviation 
and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’” 
(quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (2008)). 
79.  United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2006); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 
50 (2007). 
80.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 
7, at 2–3. 
81.  Id. 
82.  28 U.S.C. § 547. 
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prosecution of federal defendants.83 In addition to the availability of these crucial 
resources, the number of U.S. Attorneys has grown substantially. At the turn of the 
century, “the number of attorney and non-attorney positions more than tripled, 
from around 3,000 to over 10,000. And they continue to grow, though at a  
lesser pace.”84 
The Guidelines, and especially the mandatory minimums, have removed 
power from judges and brought immense power to federal prosecutors. As 
discussed above, the charge brought against a defendant indicates the total offense 
level or triggers the mandatory minimum, which in effect dictates the sentence a 
defendant will receive. Through the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table, “[t]he sentencing 
process now involves the rote consideration of a matrix of impersonal data 
dominated by often irrelevant drug quantities and other circumstances that can be 
shaped by the prosecutor’s charging choices.”85 There is no judicial review of the 
charging decisions made by prosecutors. Mark Osler, who worked as a federal 
prosecutor in Detroit, said, “I had all the power. It was about whether I filed a 
notice of enhancement or gave points for acceptance of responsibility. It’s not 
reviewable. It’s within the discretion of the prosecutor.”86 So, if a statute carries a 
lengthy minimum sentence, a judge does not have a remedy to lighten the sentence 
or revise the charge a defendant is facing. Rather, prosecutors, in effect, sentence 
convicted defendants by the charges they bring, and prosecutors typically charge 
drug defendants with offenses carrying mandatory-minimum sentences.87  Osler 
notes a primary difference between federal judges and federal prosecutors: judges’ 
work is done with transparency at the forefront, while prosecutors’ decisions are 
made in darkness. 88  Although the Presentence Investigation Report, which 
calculates the Guidelines for a judge, is completed by Federal Probation and  
Pre-Trial Services, the recommendations by federal prosecutors carry significant 
weight.89 Furthermore, judges often accept the Presentence Investigation Report as 
is and make sentencing choices based on its contents.90 
 
83.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 3-1.20 (2018). 
84.  Nora V. Demleitner, Revisiting the Role of Federal Prosecutors in Times of Mass Imprisonment, 
30 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 166 (2018). 
85.  See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33. 
86.  Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-for-judgment/46 
3380/ [https://perma.cc/QA2M-GVQ5]. 
87.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW US FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 
FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 3 (2013). 
88.  Van Meter, supra note 86. 
89. See Sentencing Project: Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme 
Court and Courts of Appeals 1989–1990: IV, 79 GEO. L.J. 1089, 1094 (1991) (“The presentence 
investigation report (PSI) plays a critical role in the judge’s determination of the applicable sentencing 
guideline range and in the imposition of an appropriate sentence.”). 
90.  See Jennifer Niles Coffin, Tap Dancing Through the Minefield: Navigating the Presentence 
Process, 31 CHAMPION 10, 10 (2007) (“[T]he presentence report . . . functions as the most powerful 
inertial force in the sentencing process.”). 
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Prosecutors effectively use the Guidelines and mandatory minimums through 
plea bargains. Because prosecutors have charging discretion, “[p]rosecutors 
frequently threaten to bring charges carrying long mandatory-minimum sentences 
and longer guidelines sentences.”91 Prosecutors claim they are not “punishing” 
defendants with lengthier sentences when they refuse a plea bargain, but rather are 
“rewarding” defendants who, by pleading guilty, spare the criminal justice system 
the expenditure of time and resources needed for a trial.92 However, from the 
perspective of the defendant who is looking at the significance of the penalty faced 
at trial, there is no difference.93 These threats can easily persuade a defendant to 
plead guilty. 
Often, prosecutors making charging decisions are fully expecting the 
defendant to plead guilty. To secure the guilty plea, 
prosecutors may then offer to lessen the charges, they may offer to reduce 
the ones that do not carry mandatory sentences, to stipulate to sentencing 
factors that lower the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines or, 
at the very least, to support a reduced sentence based on the defendant’s 
willingness to accept responsibility for the offense, i.e., to plead guilty.94 
Prosecutors can also ask for Booker waivers.95 A Booker waiver occurs when 
prosecutors press defendants to contract into a plea agreement that stipulates that 
the Guidelines are mandatory or that stipulates to a particular Guidelines sentence.96 
Booker waivers restrict a defendant’s right to petition the judge for a more lenient 
sentence.97 But, charging practices and plea negotiations vary widely within the 
country’s ninety-four judicial districts. Thirty-two percent of district court judges 
expressed that charging decisions by federal prosecutors were the number one 
reason for sentencing disparities across the federal criminal justice system.98 
While there may be some benefits to entering into a guilty plea, it is not 
without its negative consequences. Plea bargains erase the possibility of appeal on 
the merits and remove all grounds for legal defenses.99 Furthermore, defendants 
often are incentivized to testify against others in exchange for leniency.100 As a result 
of these tools available to prosecutors, every year at least ninety-five percent of 
federal drug defendants plead guilty.101 Plea bargaining can yield higher sentences 
 
91.  Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33. 
92.  See Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327,  
328–29, 343–44 (2014); HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87. 
93.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 7. 
94.  Id. at 4. 
95.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246–47 (2005). 
96.  Id. 
97.  Klein, supra note 70, at 735. 
98.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY, supra note 71, at pt. V, tbl.16. 
99. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right 
to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 875–78 (2010). 
100.  See Christopher T. Robertson & D. Alex Winkelman, Incentives, Lies, and Disclosure, 20  
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 33, 34–35, 39–40 (2017). 
101.  See Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33. 
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for defendants who opt to go to trial.102 For example, federal prosecutors offered 
to let Patricio Paladin plead in return for a twenty-year sentence for cocaine 
distribution.103 He is now serving a life sentence without the opportunity for parole 
because he refused to plead.104 In recent years, the average sentence for federal drug 
offenders convicted after trial was three times higher than that received after a guilty 
plea. 105  The possibility of a longer sentence places enormous pressure on 
defendants to plead guilty, whether or not they are actually innocent or have a strong 
legal defense. 
In addition to plea bargains, prosecutors also hold the power to ask a judge to 
grant departures. The Guidelines section 5K1.1 authorizes a departure from the 
Guidelines range if the offender provided substantial assistance to law enforcement 
and the government files a motion to that effect.106 However, Guidelines section 
5K1.1 does not authorize courts to impose a sentence below a mandatory-minimum 
penalty.107 For mandatory-minimum cases, prosecutors may file a motion pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) with the court to permit a judge to sentence below the 
mandatory-minimum sentences if a defendant has substantially aided the 
government’s efforts to prosecute others.108 However, judicial discretion is still 
limited because “[s]uch sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines 
and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”109 A prosecutor has 
full discretion on whether to file this motion with the court. 
On the other hand, prosecutors may file motions to increase the penalties 
should a defendant not plead guilty. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), prior felony drug 
convictions can dramatically increase a mandatory-minimum drug sentence.110 If a 
prosecutor files a motion informing the court of two prior convictions for a 
defendant facing a one-year mandatory-minimum sentence on the current drug 
offense, the minimum sentence increases.111 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), prosecutors 
can file charges that radically increase a defendant’s punishment if a firearm was 
involved in the drug offense.112 The first conviction imposes a mandatory five-year 
sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed for the underlying drug crime, while 
 
102.  See also, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 1–2 (“Weldon Angelos was offered a plea 
of 15 years for marijuana distribution and gun possession. He refused the plea and is now serving a  
55-year sentence.”). 
103.  Id. at 1. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 2. 
106.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
107.  Id. 
108.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
109.  Id. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 5C1.2 also allows for a safety valve for 
defendants who are sentenced under a mandatory-minimum offense but meet a certain criterion under 
the statute. However, few drug-offense defendants meet this criterion, and judges are directed to impose 
a sentence that falls within the advisory Guidelines range. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
110.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). 
111.  Id. 
112.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c); HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 5. 
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second and subsequent convictions each carry twenty-five-year consecutive 
sentences, resulting in disturbingly long sentences.113 
III. A NEED FOR REFORM 
A. Prosecutors on Top 
Formally, the Commission and the mandatory minimums sit “atop [the] 
pyramid of violence.”114 These Guidelines ranges and mandatory minimums place 
official quantitative limits on judicial discretion. Through the lens of uniformity and 
predictability, the Guidelines give the perception to a judge that there is a right 
answer when it comes to sentencing a defendant. However, by limiting judicial 
discretion, the Guidelines and mandatory minimums open the door to an unfair and 
unjust criminal “justice” system, where special circumstances and actual defendant 
culpability become unimportant and not part of the immediate sentencing 
calculus.115 There are many cases where first-time drug offenders—who played 
minimal roles in a larger criminal organization—are sentenced simply on the type  
and the quantity of drugs, leaving the judge with no remedy. The adjustments that 
attempt to “reward” a minimal participant do not drastically shift the offense level 
down.116 Furthermore, grounds for judicial departure from the advisory sentence 
are somewhat limited. The Guidelines list specific reasons and policies that should 
warrant departure.117 Normalizing departure from the Guidelines, or making it 
easier to justify departure from Chapter Three of the Guidelines, would restore 
some of the judicial discretion judges once enjoyed. 
A policy of distrust of the judiciary and judicial discretion has led to the 
creation of such an unfair and unjust system. The federal criminal justice system 
entrusts judges with wide discretion at trial, which determines innocence or guilt, 
yet rejects judicial discretion when it comes to the imposition of a sentence.118 
Operating in tandem, the Guidelines and mandatory minimums have made it very 
“difficult—and often impossible—for a judge to impose a relatively light rather 
than a heavy sentence, to find an alternative to incarceration where [it] seems 
unproductive, [and] to avoid sentences that impose unreasonable social costs.”119 
As Professor Cover notes, “The act of sentencing a convicted defendant is among 
these most routine of acts performed by judges.”120 Yet, judges have had their 
discretion in sentencing stripped away. 
 
113.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
114.  Cover, supra note 1. 
115.  See William W. Schwarzer, Commentary, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 339, 340 (1991). 
116.  See supra Section I.B. 
117.  See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
118.  Schwarzer, supra note 115, at 341. For example, judges rule on evidentiary objections that 
determine what the factfinder can consider when making its guilt determination. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Cover, supra note 1, at 1607. 
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Informally, and more importantly, practically, prosecutors now sit “atop [the] 
pyramid of violence.”121 Discretion shifted from judges to prosecutors. With the 
ability to drive sentences using plea bargains and be the gatekeepers of departures 
from mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, federal prosecutors now are in the 
driver’s seat. Charging decisions and plea bargains allow a prosecutor to dictate the 
potential sentence within a small range. These prosecutorial decisions are largely 
unreviewable on appeal, and “even when courts agree that prosecutors have sought 
egregiously long mandatory sentences for drug offenses, they will not rule the 
sentences so disproportionate as to be unconstitutionally cruel.”122 Because the 
mandatory minimums and Guidelines curtail judicial discretion, prosecutors have 
assumed much of the role of sentencing; prosecutors effectively sentence convicted 
defendants based on charges they decide to bring. 
B. What Do We Do Now? 
Now, the question is whether discretion should be restored to judges, and if 
so, how should it be restored in light of the Guidelines and mandatory minimums. 
The first step towards restoring the discretion that judges once enjoyed is to remove 
the statutorily imposed mandatory minimums, which can only be removed by 
Congress. Forcing judges to hand down unreasonably lengthy sentences fails to 
produce fair and just results. Many judges find that mandatory-minimum laws 
prevent them from practicing the principle that a convicted criminal offender 
should receive a punishment proportional to his or her crime and culpability.123 
A one-size-fits-all solution is not the panacea to creating a more just 
sentencing system, especially when the United States leads the world in 
incarceration rates.124 According to the Equal Justice Initiative, the “United States 
Department of Justice shows the United States still incarcerates its citizens at a rate 
5 to 10 times higher than other industrialized countries.”125  With the advisory 
Guidelines and proper appellate review to keep discretion in sentencing within 
reason, there is no place in our system for mandatory-minimum sentences that 
primarily serve a prosecutor’s mission to strong-arm defendants into entering a 
guilty plea.126 The Guidelines, if properly used as an advisory starting point by 
 
121.  Id. at 1609. 
122.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87. 
123.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in [the statute].”). 
124.  Sintia Radu, Countries with the Highest Incarceration Rates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 




125. United States Still Has Highest Incarceration Rate in the World, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE 
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://eji.org/news/united-states-still-has-highest-incarceration-rate-world/ 
[https://perma.cc/PS2X-ZGHT]. 
126.  See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87. 
Clean Final Edit_Weimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/19/21  3:09 PM 
1486 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1469 
judges, reduce the sentencing disparities that sparked their existence in the first 
place. But normalizing departures from the Guidelines is necessary in order for the 
Guidelines to actually be just a starting point. 
Additionally, the criminal justice system can focus efforts on making plea 
bargains more effective, if not on reducing the dominant role of plea bargains. One 
proposal is to have “executive prosecutors” in each office only dedicated to 
conducting the plea-bargaining process with defense counsel. 127  Executive 
prosecutors would “have full responsibility for evaluating the facts of all cases 
assigned to them, deciding what sentence recommendations should be made upon 
conviction following trial, and determining to what extent a recommendation 
should be reduced upon the entry of a guilty plea.”128 The recommendations from 
executive prosecutors should be based solely on the crime committed, the 
defendant’s criminal background, and the strength of the state’s case. 129  The 
executive prosecutor, devoted solely to plea bargaining, would develop great skills 
in discerning the best outcome in the most difficult cases.130 Furthermore, when 
plea bargaining is placed in the hands of a few people, uniformity and consistency 
in results for defendants will be increased.131 However, getting the “right” person 
in this position could pose a great challenge. Because the executive prosecutor will 
not be the lead attorney on the case, reliance on subjective evaluations of the 
defendant and “conflict[s] between office policies and . . . personal goals will  
be minimized.”132 
In order to effectuate this solution, prosecutors must also be pressed to 
exercise their charging discretion with fairness in mind. A maximum sentence 
mentality does not promote any of the aims of clarity, honesty, and uniformity, 
which were primary considerations in the shaping of the Guidelines. Although 
charging discretion is a necessary part of the role of a prosecutor, “the final say over 
sentences defendants receive must come from independent federal judges who have 
no personal or institutional stake in the outcome of a case other than to ensure 
justice is done and rights are respected.”133 Mandatory sentencing strips all of this 
discretion. Arguably, the Guidelines make it harder for judges to exercise this 
discretion because their initial sentencing inquiry must be calculated a certain way. 
Judges who have been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate are 
in a better position than elected and hired prosecutors to determine the ultimate 
fate of defendants.134 
 
127.  See Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119  
U. PA. L. REV. 439, 453–54 (1971). 
128.  Id. at 454. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. at 455. 
132.  Id. at 454–55. 
133. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 12. 
134.  Although judges are not directly accountable to the public, the President and Legislative 
Branch are directly accountable through elections. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 1986 and 1987, judicial discretion was formally limited for the first time by 
the introduction of mandatory minimums and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 
Mandatory minimums have forced judges to issue excessively long sentences, 
including life sentences, for those defendants convicted of drug offenses. The 
mandatory minimums do not allow for individual evaluation of each defendant and 
remove the humanizing component of sentencing so integral to the role of the 
judge. The Guidelines, released by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, provide 
advisory sentencing ranges for all offenses. For drug offenses, the primary driver of 
the sentence is the quantity of the substance, while possessing firearms, playing a 
leadership role, or having a criminal history can also increase the sentencing range. 
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory after the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in United States v. Booker, judges are still required to start their analysis by calculating 
the appropriate Guideline range and may make departures only when there are 
compelling reasons.135 
With the implementation of the mandatory minimums and Guidelines, 
Professor Cover’s assertion that judges sit “atop [the] pyramid of violence” has been 
greatly altered.136 Although the mandatory minimums and Guidelines formally limit 
judicial discretion, informally, federal prosecutors have risen to the top of this 
pyramid. With the ability to threaten draconian sentences for defendants who do 
not plead guilty, prosecutors are almost always able to secure plea bargains and 
punish those who do not accept responsibility for their alleged crimes. 137  In 
practice, prosecutors now sit “atop [of this] pyramid of violence” because, with the 
implementation of the mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, when they charge 
a defendant, they are also sentencing the defendant.138 Prosecutors are thinking 
about the sentence when they decide which charges to file at the outset of the case. 
To restore the role of sentencing to the judge, mandatory minimums must 
disappear from our federal criminal justice system. Judges must be allowed to 
exercise their discretion and have the final say in how convicted drug offenders 
should be sentenced. Because federal judges are appointed by the President, 
confirmed by the Senate, and represent a neutral party as the judiciary, they are in a 
better position than prosecutors to be making the sentencing decisions for federal 
offenders. This can be accomplished through making departure from the Guidelines 
more mainstream. Another reform, the idea of the executive prosecutor, would 
reduce plea bargains’ ability to unfairly drive sentences. Although reforms are in 
progress, we will not see judges return to their position “atop [of the] pyramid of 
violence” until formal, quantitative limits do not impede judicial discretion.139 
 
135.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265–68 (2005). 
136.  Cover, supra note 1. 
137.  See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
138.  Cover, supra note 1. 
139.  Id. 
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